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A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ETHOS FOR THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: WHY BOTHER?
JUDGE MARCIA S. KRIEGERt
For as long as I can remember, I have believed that members of the
legal profession share a common commitment to something greater than
their own self-interest-a professional ethos. The seed of this belief un-
doubtedly was sown when, as a small child, I played under the kitchen
table where my father and his law school classmates studied. Then, as I
grew, my father nurtured this belief with stories about how the law ap-
plied to situations that he encountered in his law practice and, when he
became a judge, how the law resolved controversies that he heard.
Despite periodic examples to the contrary, I have held firm to this
belief during fifteen years in law practice and another fifteen years on the
bench. However, recently, while serving on a curriculum review task
force for a local law school, I began to have doubts.
The curriculum review task force was composed of professors,
practicing lawyers, and judges. Our task was to consider the recommen-
dations of the 2007 report produced by the Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching-Educating Lawyers.' One of several com-
parative 2 studies of professional education, Educating Lawyers examined
how well law schools met the challenge of preparing law students for
their professional lives as lawyers. The report identified three critical
components to legal education: instruction in the law (doctrinal instruc-
tion), practical experience, and development of a professional identity
(ethos). It posited that law schools are particularly strong in doctrinal
instruction, but correspondingly weak in providing sufficient practical
experience and in instilling a professional identity. The report also made
specific recommendations to address these deficiencies.
t Judge Krieger serves on the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. She
expresses her appreciation for the assistance of many in the development of this article. Harry
Roberts, Esq., Justice Michael Bender, Judges Russell Carparelli, Christina Habas and David Prince,
Professors Emily Calhoun and Melissa Hart, Jim Lyons, Esq., and Capt. Miriam Krieger, USAF,
have all offered helpful ideas and constructive criticism. Thank you, too, to those who have helped
in research and editing-Madeline Kriescher of the 10th Circuit Library, Michael Smith, Kevin
Aoun, and Michelle Brand at the Denver University Law Review, law clerks Brian Bergevin and
Michelle Cormier, court reporter Paul Zuckerman, and legal assistant Janine Aguero.
1. WILLIAM M. SuLLivAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 22 (Carnegie Found. for the Advancement of Teaching 2007) [hereinafter
EDUCATING LAWYERS].
2. This report is part of the Carnegie Foundation's Preparation for the Profession Series. It is
based upon the report entitled Advancement of Teaching's Preparation for the Professions Program,
a comparative study of professional education in medicine, nursing, law, engineering and prepara-
tion for the clergy. Id. at 15.
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My assignment on the task force, along with a member of our state
Supreme Court, was to analyze the curriculum and make specific rec-
ommendations that would address the ethos component. Educating Law-
yers ties ethos to professional identity and purpose:
Professional identity is, in essence, the individual's answer to ques-
tions such as, "Who am I as a member of this profession? What am I
like, and what do I want to be like in my professional role? and What
place do ethical-social values have in my core sense of professional
identity?"
3
Educating Lawyers contends that the answer to these questions and
the starting point for professional behavior is the student's understanding
and adoption of professional values. A professional ethos defines our
purpose and transcends our self-interest. A professional ethos binds
lawyers, judges and academics together with a shared identity and com-
mitment to something that is broader than, and the foundation for, the
minimal ethical standards set forth in Canons or Codes governing profes-
sional conduct.
Consistent with our assignment, my partner and I offered several
suggestions that we thought would foster students' understanding of the
history and values of the legal profession. In discussing these matters,
however, it became apparent that we educators, lawyers and judges could
not agree on the components of a professional identity or a common set
of values that should be taught to law students. We debated over the
profession's purpose, what role lawyers should play in society and
whether we had any cohesive professional beliefs. Ultimately, unable to
agree on a professional ethos, we reverted to discussing methods for
teaching the mandatory provisions of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility.
The inability of this task force to identify any common commitment
or value that constitutes the ethos of the legal profession led me to pond-
er whether we have one and whether having one matters. This article
chronicles my attempt to answer these questions.
I conclude that because American society is unique in its belief in
and dependence upon the Rule of Law, the beliefs and behavior of law-
yers matter. American society is experiencing a Cycle of Cynicism that
threatens public confidence in the law and legal institutions. If we do not
find ways to reverse this Cycle of Cynicism and restore public confi-
dence, the cohesiveness of American society and our individual rights
and freedoms will be in jeopardy. Lawyers have the ability to combat
this Cycle of Cynicism, but only if they are willing, as a profession, to
3. Id. at 135.
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explore, articulate and adopt a common commitment to a value greater
than their self interest-to the Rule of Law.
I. IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, WHAT LAWYERS BELIEVE ABOUT THE LAW
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS MATTERS
Law is essential to social order and justice: it requires specialized
knowledge that only lawyers possess; the public needs lawyers to fa-
cilitate their intercourse with one another and to protect them from
harm by others and from government; lawyers have a special role in
the state as guardians of the legal order.
4
A. The existence of American society and government is premised upon
law
Few would dispute that America is unique. We are a heterogeneous
nation comprised predominantly of immigrants, and the descendants of
immigrants, from every country on the globe. Due to this diversity, we
lack the underpinnings that unite and stabilize more homogeneous socie-
ties-a common language, ancestral history, culture, religion, traditions
or clan/tribal ties. We highly prize individuality, initiative and freedom;
indeed, it is such freedom that has attracted immigrants with vastly dif-
ferent backgrounds and values to our shores.
To unite such a diverse population while ensuring individual free-
dom, we rely on law. Law acts as the mortar that holds the disparate
bricks of our society together. Although we may disagree with the wis-
dom of particular laws, or we may wish that some could be changed or
set aside, we accept this system of law because it provides Americans
with unparalleled liberty, democratic access, security, stability and eco-
nomic opportunity.
We come by our reliance on law honestly. Our country's first Eu-
ropean immigrants came from societies with strong legal traditions. The
sojourners on the Mayflower governed themselves by legal compact, as
did other early colonial communities. As the English colonies expanded
the scope of their self-government, they formally recognized reciprocal
rights and obligations between citizens and the king, and it was the per-
ceived breach of the king's and parliament's obligations to British citi-
zens in the Americas that led to the American Revolution.
Many of our nation's founders were students of the classics. They
read Socrates, Aristotle and Cicero. They adopted classical notions
found in Enlightenment thinking, among which was the idea that there
are certain "natural laws" that govern relationships among people. The
political ideals of John Locke set forth in his Second Treatise of Gov-
emnment (1690) and Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Bride et de
4. BIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 138 (2006).
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Montesquieu, described in the Spirit of the Laws (1748) are reflected in
the Federalist Papers (1787-88) written by James Madison, Alexander
Hamilton and John Jay.
Locke believed that guided by reason, and subject to natural law,
individuals could enjoy perfect freedom and equality. He reasoned that
natural law requires individuals to do no harm to others in their enjoy-
ment of life, health, liberty and possessions. 5 By extension of this idea,
he thought that individuals could and should bind together to create a
government of limited powers that would make, execute and apply laws
for the common good. He contrasted dominion by one person over
another to a society that was ruled by law. In a society based on law, the
law would preserve individual freedom and equality for everyone.
[F]reedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to
live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legis-
lative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all
things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the in-
constant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man .... 6
Montesquieu reinforced this ideal in the context of individual liber-
ty. He identified "liberty" as living under the rule of law.7 He reasoned
that if every person was free to do what he or she desired, all would be
under threat of others doing the same. Individual liberty would thus be
maximized if everyone was restrained from doing harm to others. Law
would act as the consensual restraint. In essence, the law would set
boundaries within which people could act as they chose. "Liberty is a
right of doing whatever the laws permit.",
8
Locke and Montesquieu derived their view of the role of law from
what they believed was divinely inspired "natural" law. Embedded in
their views is a paradox that was perhaps most concisely stated centuries
earlier by Cicero, "[W]e are all servants of the laws, for the very purpose
of being able to be freemen." 9
A paradox is an apparent contradiction. By recognizing the funda-
mental connection between apparent opposites and holding them in ten-
sion with each other, a paradox often embodies a fundamental truth and
produces great energy. Here, the apparent contradiction is that the law
5. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 9 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publ'g 1980) (1690).
6. Id. at 17.
7. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 52 (5th
ed. 2007) (referring to THOMAS L. PANGLE, MONTESQUIE'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERALISM 109
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1973)).
8. I BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 150 (Thomas Nugent trans., P.F. Colier
& Son 1900).
9. I MARCUS TULLiUS CICERO, THE ORATIONS OF MARCuS TULLIUS CICERO 164 (C.D.
Yonge trans., G. Bell & Sons 1917).
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which restrains individual behavior also guarantees individual freedom.
The energy of this paradox was the hope of our nation's founders.
The Declaration of Independence reflects notions of natural law in
its announcement that "the Creator" has given every person an "unalien-
able right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." In drafting the
Constitution, our forefathers attempted to translate the paradox recog-
nized by Locke, Montesquieu and other Enlightenment political philoso-
phers into a functioning governmental structure in which a limited gov-
ernment would protect individual interests and maximize individual li-
berty. Through a careful calibration of what we refer to as "checks and
balances," the Constitution was designed to preserve popular democracy
but prevent complete control by the government or by the largest, most
organized or powerful groups. It became the "fundamental law"' 0 to
secure "a government of laws, and not of men.
'' I
Consistent with that purpose, our state and federal governments
have been animated and constrained by the law, and virtually every so-
cial development in our country's history has been tied to the law. Law
has supported economic and geographic expansion and forged interna-
tional connections.1 2 Our nation's history has been punctuated by events
either of legal significance or which have legal components. For exam-
ple, the Louisiana Purchase was a commercial transaction. Treaties with
Native Americans and foreign countries are contracts. The justification
for the civil war, according to President Lincoln, was the breach of the
Constitution by the southern states' decision to secede. As a student of
the classics and an accomplished lawyer, Lincoln initiated a process that
eventually converted the natural law concept that "all men are created
Equal" (found in the Declaration of Independence) into the law of the
land (the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution).'
3
During the nineteenth century, industrialization and expansion were both
facilitated and limited by state and congressional legislation. And in the
twentieth century, a multitude of social changes, including expansion of
workers rights, recovery from the depression and implementation of civil
rights, have been embodied in statutory enactment or judicial decree, or
both.
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penguin Books 1961).
11. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
12. For example, bankruptcy and commercial laws were enacted, repealed and modified to
facilitate the growth of business and to address economic fluctuations. The first bankruptcy law was
enacted in 1800 in response to the economic panics of 1792 and 1797. It was repealed in 1803. This
was followed by another national bankruptcy act in 1841, repealed a year later. The panic of 1857
and the financial cataclysm of the Civil War spurred consideration of another bankruptcy act in
1867. This act was repealed in 1878. In 1898, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act, which was
amended several times, but not replaced until adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. This was
most recently modified in 2005.
13. Susan Schulten, Professor of History, Lincoln and the Constitution (Jan. 2009) (presenta-
tion at the Univ. of Denver) (manuscript on file with author).
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In this country, we expect the law to reflect and reinforce our social
values and protect the rights of every citizen, and we expect our legal
institutions to do the same. Indeed, this expectation is chiseled into the
cornice of the building that houses the United States Supreme Court-
"Equal Justice Under Law." We proudly proclaim to the rest of the
world that we are a society based upon the Rule of Law.
14
B. Law remains an ever-present component of American culture even in
the Twenty-First Century
For better or worse, modem American society is even more infused
with the law and legal processes than it was in prior generations.15 One
need only turn on the television, open the newspaper, surf the Internet,
go the bookstore, examine most any institution or listen to popular con-
versation to see legal threads woven into our culture.
A quick internet search for television programming reveals ten faux
courtroom programs (e.g. Judge Judy) and thirty-six legal dramas (e.g.
Boston Legal). 16 Many stations and producers have hired legal experts to
opine on the legal news item du jour. Every newspaper contains mul-
tiple articles with a legal theme--criminal investigations, court proceed-
ings, the effect of judicial rulings, the anticipated or actual impact of
statutes or regulations, commentary on what the law should be, or stories
about miscreant lawyers and judges. The Internet is filled with websites
and blogs that assess legal thought, court opinions, legal/social issues,
judges and attorneys. Books of all genres include legal themes; there is
even an independent genre of legal thrillers.
1 7
Virtually no social, business or governmental institution operates in
the absence of rules and procedures for enforcing them, or without an
attempt to comply with laws and regulations. 18 Schools have codes of
14. See, for example, the ABA Rule of Law Initiative website, which states that "rule of law
promotion is the most effective long-term antidote to the pressing problems facing the world com-
munity today, including poverty, economic stagnation, and conflict." ABA RULE OF LAW
INITIATIVE, http://www.abanet.org/rol/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2009). For a more recent example of the
emphasis on the "rule of law" in the international community, see News Release, Human Rights
Watch, Southern Sudan: Protect Civilians, Improve Rule of Law (Feb. 12, 2009), available at
http:llwww.hrw.orglenlnews/2009/02/12/southern-sudan-protect-civilians-improve-rule-law.
15. Some commentators argue that the root of this is a surplus of both lawyers and laws. See
generally, e.g., PAUL F. CAMPOS, JURISMANIA: THE MADNESS OF AMERICAN LAW (1998) (explain-
ing lawyers contribute to the overuse of laws in the United States); PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH
OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994) (explaining that inefficient de-
crees suffocate Americans); PHILIP K. HOWARD, LIFE WITHOUT LAWYERS: LIBERATING
AMERICANS FROM Too MUCH LAW (2009) (explaining that Americans are flooded with legal rules).
16. See Yahoo, Legal Drama TV Shows, http://dir.yahoo.com/EntertainmentfFelevision_
Shows/Drama/Legal/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
17. For examples of recent legal thrillers, see MICHAEL CONNELLY, THE BRASS VERDICT
(2008); LINDA FAIRSTEN, KILLER HEAT (2008); LINDA FAIRSTEIN, LETHAL LEGACY (2009); JOHN
GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008); JOHN GRISHAM, THE ASSOCIATE (2009); JOHN LESCROART,
BETRAYAL (2008); RICHARD NORTH PATTERSON, ECLIPSE (2009).
18. In this context, I am reminded of a question that my daughter raised when her fighter pilot
squadron wanted to acquire a bus in order to ensure that pilots who had partied too much could be
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conduct and procedures for imposing discipline. Employers maintain
employee manuals, dress codes and privacy codes and create whole de-
partments to ensure that employees comply with applicable laws and
regulations. Home owner associations and other informal groups adopt
policies to regulate behavior of members and to avoid running afoul of
the law.
Even casual conversation reveals legal threads. Everyone who has
watched Law and Order knows what it means to "read somebody their
rights." Indeed, it would not be surprising to learn that most children
over the age of 12 can recite the Miranda advisements. Arguments and
disagreements often include challenges and dismissals such as, "So sue
me . . ." or "See ya in court." Even the most non-adversarial among us
recognize the idioms, "Don't make a federal case out of it," or "I'll take
this case all the way to the Supreme Court."
To resolve our disputes, we file thirty times more lawsuits per capi-
ta in the United States than do citizens of any other country. 19 For exam-
ple, in Colorado, which currently has a population of approximately four
million, over 750,000 new cases/appeals were initiated in the state
courts2° and another 17,000 were initiated in the federal courts2' during
2007. A recent study conducted by the Institute for the Advancement of
the American Legal System and the League of Women Voters reports
that almost half of the respondents said they or a family member had
been in a courtroom within the past five years-39% of that number as
jurors, 22% in family court matters, and 18% as a party in a civil law-
suit.
22
C. The pervasive role of law in American society is evidence of a core
value-reverence for the Rule of Law
Although we may feel overburdened by the law, and indeed we may
have too many laws, our unbroken history and tradition of relying on the
law and legal institutions reflects the energy of the paradox upon which
our society rests-that law exists to maximize our liberty and opportuni-
assured of a safe drive home by a designated driver. Such a laudable objective was to comply with
laws regulating drinking and driving and the regulatory fallout of failing to do so in both a civil and
military context. This very simple and sensible solution necessarily required exploration of who or
what should own the bus, how ownership could be transferred as membership in the squadron
changed, how it could be insured, and how the cost of its operation, maintenance, and insurance
could be shared (enforced) among its beneficiaries.
19. See Power of Attorneys, Are there too many Lawyers?, http://www.power-of-
attorneys.com/arethere_toomanyjawyers.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2009).
20. Colorado State Judicial Branch, Court Facts, http:llwww.courts.state.co.uslCourtsl
Education/CourtFacts.cfm (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
21. JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2007 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 151 tbl.3-C, 297 tbl.F (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.govl
judbus2007/contents.html.
22. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYSTEM & LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS, 2007 COLORADO VOTER OPINIONS ON THE JUDICIARY 3 (2007), available at
http://www.lwvcolorado.org/executivesummaryl.pdf.
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ty. This esoteric concept has long since been absent from popular par-
lance; our modem reference to the paradox is found in the phrase the
Rule of Law.
Although many cannot define what the Rule of Law is, they readily
advocate it as a core value. Indeed, in recent years, reference to the Rule
of Law has become increasingly common. The phrase often appears in
political speeches, is used to justify political policy, has been the subject
of books and articles, and was even the annual theme for the American
Bar Association in 2008.
Widespread reference to the Rule of Law may have caused it to be-
come trite to some, but the concept continues to inspire both interest
3
and devotion.24 Scholars have written a multitude of books2 and ar-
ticles26 seeking to define it and explain its effect. Just recently in an in-
terview published as part of the "7 Questions-The Law" series, Judge
23. Websites on the Internet dedicated to the rule of law include: ABA Rule of Law Initiative
(www.abanet.org/rol); Center for the Rule of Law (www.centerfortheruleoflaw.org); and the Rule
of Law Resource Center (law.lexisnexis.com/webcenters/RuleoflawResourceCenter).
24. Of note outside of the U.S., lawyers in Pakistan have protested for reinstitution of the Rule
of Law and an independent judiciary. See James Traub, Can Pakistan Be Governed?, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Apr. 5, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/magazine/05zardari-
t.html?partner=rss.
25. There are too many books and articles addressing the Rule of Law to provide a compre-
hensive list. The following are only a few examples of recent, scholarly discussions: RONALD A.
CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA (2001); DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW (Jose Maria
Maravall & Adam Przeworshi eds., 2003); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND
DEMOCRACY (2003); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW (2004); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION (3d ed. 2007).
Some much older writings include: T. R S. ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: THE
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH CONSTITUTIONALISM (1993); ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
(Terence Irwin ed., 1985); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (Stephen Everson ed., 1988); RANDY BARNETr,
THE STRUCrURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1998); CICERO, THE REPUBLIC AND
THE LAWS (Niall Rudd trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
(1986); LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961);
F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976); F. A.
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE SOCIETY (1979); F. A.
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER, (1973); F. A. HAYEK, THE
POLITICAL IDEA OF THE RULE OF LAW (1955); F. A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944);
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881); LOCKE, supra note 5; ROSCOE POUND, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE LAW (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 6th ed. 2003); REDRAFrING THE RULE OF LAW: THE
LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1999); THE RULE OF LAW (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994);
THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY (Allan C. Hutcheson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987); THE
RULE OF LAW UNDER SIEGE: SELECTED ESSAYS OF FRANZ L. NEUMAN AND OTro KIRCHHEIMER
(William E. Scheuerman ed., 1996); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY (1979); SAMUEL RUTHERFORD, LEx, REX, OR THE LAW AND THE PRINCE: A DISPUTE
FOR THE JUST PREROGATIVE OF KING AND PEOPLE (1644).
26. See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95 (1998); Paul
Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law, 1997 PUB. L. 467 (1997); Ofer
Raban, Real and Imagined Threats to the Rule of Law: On Brian Tamanaha's Law As a Means to an
End, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 478 (2008); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as Law of Rules, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989); Kim Lane Scheppele, When the Law Doesn't Count: The 2000 Election
and the Failure of the Rule of Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2001); Robert S. Summers, A Formal
Theory of the Rule of Law, 6 RATIO JURIS 127 (1993); Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essen-
tially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137 (2002); Azar Nafisi, Hiding Behind the
Rule ofLaw, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1997, at A39.
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Deanell Tacha, former Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, was asked how the Rule of Law relates to professionalism among
lawyers. 27 And not surprisingly, recent comments about U.S. involve-
ment in Iraq and Afghanistan have focused upon implementation of a
rule of law.28
Defining the Rule of Law is a matter of much debate among both
scholars and pragmatists. What are its essential components? How do
they stabilize societies? Often these questions have different answers
depending upon the context or the society being considered. Recogniz-
ing this, scholars have characterized the varying definitions of the Rule
of Law in degrees from "thin" to "thick." Generally, a "thin" definition
pertains to universal qualities-for example, the Rule of Law is a system
of laws that protects liberty and property rights, and the laws are univer-
sally applied. A "thicker" definition might incorporate ideas unique to a
particular culture-for example, the Rule of Law incorporates a demo-
cratic process to create and revise laws, the existence of written laws,
predictable procedures and methods for enforcement of laws and the
existence of a fair and impartial judiciary, and the right to due process.
For the purposes of this article, one need not precisely define the
Rule of Law nor, in scholarly fashion, characterize it by its "thinness" or
"thickness." Instead, recognizing that the Rule of Law is a shorthand
way of characterizing the fundamental paradox of the role of law in the
United States, one can focus on the meaning the Rule of Law has in the
minds of the American public.
Americans understand the Rule of Law to mean that no man is
above the law.29 We often attribute this idea to the Magna Carta, but
actually it implemented the Rule of Law by imposing unprecedented
constraints on the king. In our own national history, the concept is mir-
rored in our foundational documents, democratic values, and the struc-
ture of our government.
27. See Matthew Crouch, 7 Questions-The Law Series: An Interview with Honorable Dea-
nell Tacha of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, MILE HIVE, Jan. 22, 2009,
http://tinyurl.com/db92np.
28. See Training and Equipping Afghan Security Forces: Unaccounted Weapons and Strateg-
ic Challenges: Hearing Before the Subconm. on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111 th Cong. (Feb. 12, 2009), available at 2009
WLNR 2870483 (testimony of Mark L. Schneider, Senior Vice President, International Crisis
Group) ("I would hope that the end of the current review of U.S. strategy for Afghanistan will raise
the priority attached to establishing an effective Afghan National Police force within a functioning
rule of law."); New Court House Opens in Bagdad, U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 10, 2008, available at
2008 WLNR 17342770 ("Iraqi Chief Justice Medhat referred to the importance of the Justice Palace
in establishing the rule of law in Iraq. Medhat gave thanks to the Coalition forces and a special
recognition to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the workmanship and diligence.").
29. Interestingly, this is the definition given for the "Rule of Law" in the Colorado Model
Content Standards for Civics. See COLO. MODEL CONTENT STANDARDS FOR CIVICS 25 (1998),
http:llwww.cde.state.co.uslcdeassessldocumentslOSA/standardscivics.pdf.
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From this basic tenet grow several expectations. First, no person or
group may ignore or violate the law without consequence. In other
words, the law should be equally, consistently and predictably applied to
everyone. Second, the government, too, is be bound by the law. Our
government has limited power, and as a consequence, no person working
for the government, no agency, and no branch of government may vi-
olate the law. We expect those in government to follow it. Third, the
law should be public rather than secret. This is why we require public
legislative and judicial sessions, have written statutes and published judi-
cial opinions, 30 and why we are deeply suspicious of secret communica-
tions by those in power. Finally, the law should be created, modified and
replaced only by the process that society has prescribed in the law.
In practical terms, we believe the law is something that we create,
but once created, it binds us all. The law stands separate from us, as in-
dividuals and groups. Even though each of us, from time to time, resents
the fact that we have to comply with the law, we nevertheless count on it
to protect us and the society in which we live. It is this universality that
integrates the diverse, heterogeneous American society in which we live.
D. In American society, the beliefs and behavior of lawyers matter
Although lawyers are often the target of criticism and humor, in
American society lawyers exert profound individual and collective influ-
ence. The influence of the legal profession grows from a number of
sources--our specialized knowledge about the law, our number and di-
versity, and the wide variety of roles we play.
In his classic study Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville
presaged the important role that lawyers would play. He wrote:
In visiting the Americans and studying their laws, we perceive that
the authority they have entrusted to members of the legal profession,
and the influence that these individuals exercise in the government,
are the most powerful existing security against the excesses of de-
31mocracy.
More recently, scholars have directly tied the role of lawyers to the
very foundations of American society. Judith Shklar observes:
The tendency to think of law as "there" as a discrete entity, discerni-
bly different from morals and politics, has its deepest roots in the le-
gal profession's view of its own functions, and forms the very basis
of most of our judicial institutions and procedures.
32
30. And public court records.
31. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve
trans., Everyman's Library ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1994) (1835).
32. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 9 (1964).
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Put in a more popular and humorous context, Jerry Seinfeld explained,
A lawyer is basically the person who knows the rules of the country.
We're all throwing the dice, playing the game, moving our pieces
round the board, but if there is a problem, the lawyer is the only per-
son who read the inside of the top of the box.
33
Another reason lawyers are influential is that there are a lot of us.
Currently, there are more than 1.1 million lawyers in the United States,
more in toto and per capita than in any other country in the world.34 In
195 1, one out of every 695 persons was a lawyer; but by 2001, the ratio
of lawyers to non-lawyers had almost tripled to one out of every 264
persons. 35 And, more are coming. As of June 2008, there are 200 accre-
dited law schools in the country.36  Enrollment in these schools is just
shy of 150,000 students each year.37
Finally, lawyers play a wide variety of vital roles in American so-
ciety. According to national ABA statistics, more than 750,000 lawyers
are in private practice, more than 88,000 work for the government, ap-
proximately 95,000 are employed in private industry or for private asso-
ciations, 33,000 serve as judges and 11,000 teach.38
Twenty-six of our forty-three presidents have been lawyers, 39 and
two have had spouses who are also lawyers.4° Routinely, upwards of
40% of the members of the U.S. House of Representatives, and more in
the U.S. Senate, are lawyers. 41 Their office staffs and the staffs of con-
gressional committees are dominated by lawyers, as are members of the
executive branch and regulatory agencies. In my home state, eighteen
33. Seinfeld: The Visa (NBC television broadcast Jan. 27, 1993), available at
http://www.seinfeldscripts.comiTheVisa.html.
34. AM. BAR Ass'N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2008), http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/
Lawyer_- Demographics_- 2008.pdf [hereinafter LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS].
35. CLARA N. CARSON, AM. BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S.
LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2000 27 (2004); BARBARA CURRAN & CLARA N. CARSON, AM. BAR FOUND.,
THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1990's (1994).
36. ABA Approved Law Schools, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/approvedlawschools/
approved.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
37. See Memorandum from David Rosenlieb, Data Specialist, Section of Legal Educ. &
Admission to the Bar, to Deans of ABA-approved Law Schools (Feb. 15, 2008),
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/resources/2007-08%2EnroUment%2OMemo.pdf (providing detailed
information on enrollment statistics for law schools in 2006 and 2007).
38. Id.
39. See America's Lawyer Presidents, http://www.abanet.org/museumI/exhibit.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2009). At time of publication, the article has not been updated to reflect the election
of President Barack Obama.
40. Hillary Clinton and Michelle Obama are lawyers.
41. See MARK C. MILLER, THE HIGH PRIESTS OF AMERICAN POLITICS: THE ROLE OF
LAWYERS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 59 (1995); C-Span: 109th Congress Statistics,
http://www.c-span.org/congress/lO9congress.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
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governors have been lawyers, 42 and the ratio of lawyers to non-lawyers
in the state legislature is only slightly less than in Congress.43
In recent years, we have become more diverse as a profession. No
longer are American lawyers invariably members of a wealthy, white,
male elite. ABA statistics in 2000 reported that 27% of lawyers were
women and 12% identified themselves as people of color. 44
Put simply, lawyers are trained in the law and, we sincerely hope, in
its value to American society. We populate all walks of life. We are
mothers and fathers, sisters and brothers, daughters and sons. We are
employers and employees, writers, teachers, litigators, advisors, business
owners, legislators, government officials and judges. We work for gov-
ernment, for private clients and in business. We live in a variety of
neighborhoods, belong to churches, synagogues, mosques and clubs, help
in charitable and political causes, teach our children and converse with
our neighbors and families. We make the news, enforce, create and
change the law, and we are, whether we like it or not, role models for
other citizens. What we believe about the Rule of Law, and how we im-
plement it, matters.
II. A CYCLE OF CYNICISM THREATENS CONFIDENCE IN OUR LEGAL
SYSTEM AND THE RULE OF LAW
A. Public Distrust
Few would disagree that since the middle of the twentieth century
American society has become increasingly distrustful of its governmental
and legal institutions. Some historians mark the advent of popular skep-
ticism as beginning with the Vietnam War or Watergate. Some trace its
roots to moral and political relativism that developed in the early decades
of the twentieth century. Yet others would claim that such skepticism
has long existed. For example, we all remember the Shakespearian ref-
erence to killing all the lawyers.45
Part of the public distrust is attributable to our nature and habits. At
the very fiber of American populism is a distrust of government power
and fear of its excesses. To the extent that governmental structure and
42. See About the Governor, http://www.colorado.gov/cs/SatelliteIGovRitter/GOVRI
1177024890365 (last visited April 10, 2009) (describing Governor Bill Ritter's educational back-
ground); Colorado Governors, http://www.colorado.gov/dpaldoit/archiveslgovslindex.htm (last
visited Apr. 10, 2009) (providing biographical information on all Colorado Governors from 1876 to
1975); DU Portfolio Community I Dick Lamm, https://portfolio.du.edu/pc/port?portfolio=rlamm
(last visited April 10, 2009); Colorado's Governor Roy Romer: biography,
http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/doit/archives/romer/govbio.htm (last visited April 10, 2009).
43. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, OCCUPATIONAL DATA WESTERN
REGIONAL STATES TABLE 1, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/about/OccupationWestl.htm
(last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
44. See LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, supra note 34.
45. "The first thing we do [when we take over the government], let's kill all the lawyers."
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2.
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legal institutions are intertwined, skepticism with regard to one can bleed
into skepticism about the other. Indeed, our country has gone through
several cycles during which the public became distrustful of legal institu-
tions. The Jeffersonians repealed judgeships. President Jackson defied
Supreme Court rulings. During the Civil War, Congress reduced the size
of the Supreme Court and stripped it of its jurisdiction to determine
whether Congress had the power to impose military rule in the southern
states. In the nineteenth century, many states abolished the appointment
of judges and replaced the selection systems with popular elections.
In recent decades, however, public distrust of lawyers and legal in-
stitutions has surged again. A number of new factors may contribute to
the current situation.
First, there has been a decline in knowledge about civic organiza-
tion and citizen responsibilities. For several decades, there has been a
decline in focus on substantive civics education in the public schools.
46
According to Bert Brandenburg, the Executive Director of Justice at
Stake, many Americans cannot correctly name all three branches of gov-
ernment; one-third cannot name any of them; and more than one in five
Americans do not believe that the Supreme Court can declare an act of
Congress unconstitutional.47
To the extent that citizens have not formally learned about the pur-
pose of the law or how legal institutions work, it is human nature to fill
in the gap with popular information. We rely on urban myths, what our
friends or the media tell us, what we hear over the back fence, from Nan-
cy Grace, or what we see on Law and Order. Many of the jurors who
serve in matters before me comment after the trial that they were sur-
prised to learn how a trial actually works; that it is not like anything they
have seen on TV, and that, based on their experience, they would look
forward to serving again sometime.
Second, we have become a nation of consumers who believe we can
purchase anything we want. In this expectation, we do not differentiate
between goods and services. We shop for cars, colleges and legal repre-
sentation. We believe that we get what we pay for, or that "money
talks." Clients, corporate and private, are often savvy customers who do
not hesitate to specify the results they expect. In the litigation context, I
call this the attempt to buy "Burger King Justice," i.e., justice, my way.
46. Research has shown a marked trend away from civics and social studies in the elementary
grades, and that civic education in high school is usually limited to a single course. See, e.g., Joyce
Baldwin, Civic Education in Schools, 2 CARNEGIE REPORTER 12, 15 (2003), available at
http://www.carnegie.org/pdf/camreporterfaU03.pdf. In Colorado, there is no requirement for a civics
or government class. Instead, civics themes are to be included in the content of classes devoted to
other topics.
47. Bert Brandenburg, Exec. Dir., Justice At Stake Campaign, Address at the Colorado Judi-
cial Institute's Judicial Excellence Dinner (Nov. 18, 2008).
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Third, we are increasingly savvy about science and technology, and
as a result, we naively believe that scientific and technological metho-
dologies apply to every walk of life. We take pills for ills, and so we
expect them or their technological cousins to solve all our problems.48 In
trials, it is not uncommon for jurors to be disappointed if no "CSI" type
forensic evidence is presented. In addition, we are used to communicat-
ing quickly and efficiently using a host of media-face to face, email,
cell phone, instant message, Twitter or Facebook. We expect prompt, if
not instant, responses. It is quite a disappointment, therefore, to discover
that, unlike other aspects of life, legal affairs are rarely characterized by
certainty or speed.
Fourth, lawyers are frequently caricatured in jokes and by the media
in ways that promote distrust. They have been characterized in the mov-
ies as "miserable human beings, either unethical or incompetent at their
jobs. 49 In her book, In the Interests of Justice, Deborah Rhode analyzed
survey data showing that a substantial portion of the public perceives
lawyers as greedy, unethical and arrogant. °
Marc Galanter, a law professor who has long studied public impres-
sions of lawyers, reported in 1998 that the public's estimation of lawyers,
which has not been high in the past, continues to drop. 51  Those who
thought lawyers less honest than most people rose from 17% in 1986 to
31% in 1993. In 1991, a national survey inquired as to "what profession
or type of worker do you trust the least." "Lawyers" was far and away
the most frequent response. Almost as many people (23%) identified
lawyers as untrustworthy as the next two categories (car salesman 13%,
politicians 11%), combined. But Galanter goes on to argue that the pub-
lic does not condemn lawyers without qualification. Rather, the public
approves of lawyers' commitment to their clients, but it distrusts law-
yers' commitment to anything else-such as to honesty, truth, or the law.
Because lawyers play so many roles in society, distrust of lawyers
bleeds into distrust of the law and legal systems. And it is fed by general
skepticism about government. This is not at all surprising given the
steady drumbeat of scandals involving business people, government fig-
48. This brings to mind a recent advertisement in The Economist for a course in history. The
advertisement reads, in part, "Now More than Ever, We Must Learn the Lessons of History.... The
challenge Professor Fears poses ... is especially pertinent during the 'ahistorical age' ... an era
when too many people are willing to invest in a 'dangerous delusion' that 'science, technology, the
global economy, and the information superhighway all make us immune to the lessons of history,'
and that 'in an age of global economy, war and tyranny will become things of the past."' Advertise-
ment, ECONOMIST, Jan. 3, 2009, at 43.
49. Sandra Day O'Connor, Professionalism, Address at Dedication of the William W. Knight
Law Center, in 78 OR. L. REv. 385, 386 (1999) (quotations omitted).
50. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION
3-5 (2000).
51. Marc Galanter, Robert S. Marx Lecture: The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in
Public Opinion, Jokes and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 805, 809 (1998).
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ures, lawyers and judges. One only need reflect on recent scandals that
embroiled prominent leaders (many of whom were lawyers): President
Bill Clinton, U.S. Congressmen Randy Cunningham and Robert Ney,
Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich, Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez,
Alaska Senator Ted Stevens and the justice department attorneys that
prosecuted him, as well as a variety of federal and state judges.
In addition, for decades the news has been telling the public about
policy-infused court decisions. Sometimes the portrayal of the court as a
policy maker is accurate, but sometimes it is not. News reports that iden-
tify judges by political party or the president who appointed them, and
then go on to short-circuit legal and factual complexity by reducing court
rulings to sound bites, imply that judicial decisions are merely the result
of judges' political beliefs. To the extent that people do not have a clear
understanding of how various courts work, the profusion of stories about
the Supreme Court's policy cum legal decisions understandably leads
many to assume that all judges engage in social or political policy mak-
ing. Unfortunately, such notion is also fueled by lawyers who argue to
lower court judges that they should base their decisions on political or
social policy and by lower court judges who do so.
Thus, it is not entirely surprising that a 1999 Hearst Report commis-
sioned by the National Center for State Courts concluded that a growing
portion of the public believes that courts are out of touch with the reality
in their communities and that judicial decisions result from personal or
political biases. Many members of the public believe that using the judi-
cial process costs too much, takes too much time and favors the rich.
The Annenberg Public Policy Center's September 2006 study reported
that 75 % of those surveyed believed that a judge's ruling is influenced by
his or her personal political views to a great or moderate degree, 62%
believe that courts favor the wealthy and another 62% believe that the
courts in their state are legislating from the bench rather than applying
the law.
The upshot of all this is that references to "judicial activism" and to
judges as "tyrants in black robes",5 2 have become a staple of talk radio,
cable and the blogosphere. Readers Digest regularly publishes a list of
"America's Worst Judges." Criticism of courts and judicial decisions is
routinely incorporated into the speaking points of politicians. For exam-
ple, at the national "Justice Sunday" event organized a couple of years
ago, the organizer referred to judges as supremacists, adding that the
Supreme Court poses a greater threat to representative government than
budget deficits and terrorist groups.53
52. These comments, interestingly, iterate the public's fundamental view of the law-no
person, not even a judge, should be above it.
53. Brandenburg, supra note 47.
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As in prior historical cycles, it is not surprising that citizens who are
dissatisfied and distrust legal institutions have initiated a number of
measures to restrain judges and restructure court systems. The 2006
election cycle brought Amendment 40 in Colorado, JAIL4JUDGES in
South Dakota, and Measure 40 in Oregon. 54 In 1997, the majority leader
of the United States House of Representatives (also a lawyer) declared
that "judges need to be intimidated. 55 More recently, Congress consi-
dered the appointment of an Inspector General for the federal judiciary,
which inspired the creation of a special committee chaired by U.S. Su-
preme Court Justice Stephen Breyer to investigate and report on the
manner in which complaints of judicial misconduct are handled.56
The foregoing factors have blurred the boundaries separating the
three branches of government. When courts are perceived as encroach-
ing upon the prerogatives of the legislative branch by fashioning and
imposing social policy, the legislative branch retaliates. There are inqui-
ries by the Senate into the political views and anticipated judicial rulings
during confirmation hearings for federal judicial nominees, legislative
efforts are made to reduce federal court jurisdiction and attempts are
made to direct the outcomes in pending litigation, such as in the Terry
Schiavo case. This amalgam makes it harder and harder for citizens to
have confidence in the Rule of Law.
B. Lawyer Dissatisfaction
According to many observers, the decline in public esteem for law-
yers and legal institutions also correlates to dissatisfaction within the
profession-a decline in professional civility, increase in adversarialism,
decline in the role of the lawyer as counselor, decline in attorney compe-
tence, and greater competition among attorneys for clients and fees. Al-
though there is some disagreement among researchers as to the degree of
54. Colorado's proposed Amendment 40 sought to strictly limit the term of all state appellate
judges. See STATE OF COLORADO, ANALYSIS OF THE 2006 BALLOT PROPOSALS 7-8 (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.state.co.us/gov -dir/leg-dir/lcsstaff/bluebook/Bluebook2006.pdf. The Amendment
would have applied retroactively, and would have "immediately removed nineteen of the state's
twenty-six appellate judges from the bench." Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, A Perfor-
mance Evaluation Program for the Federal Judiciary, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 7, 28 (2008). The
"Jail4Judges" initiative in South Dakota would have allowed a "Special Grand Jury" to assess fines
and penalties against judges and prosecutors who violated rules established by the grand juries. See
CHRIS NELSON & KEA WARNE, SOUTH DAKOTA 2006 BALLOT QUESTIONS, available at
http://www.sdsos.gov/electionsvoteregistration/electvoterpdfs/2006SouthDakotaBallotQuestionPam
phlet.pdf; see also Kourlis & Singer, supra at n.123.
Oregon's Measure 40, proposed in 2006, would have required state appellate judges to be
elected by district, and would have established strict residency requirements for judges running for
election in a particular district. See OR. SEC'Y OF STATE, MEASURE 40 EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
(2006), available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov72006/military-vp/m40_es.pdf.
55. Joan Biskupic, Hill Republicans Target 'Judicial Activism', WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1997,
at AOl (quoting then-majority whip Tom DeLay).
56. The report of this Committee resulted in the Judicial Conference of the United States
adopting national procedures for resolution of such complaints and for public disclosure of their
outcome.
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dissatisfaction among lawyers,57 the evidence is unavoidable. 8  In ad-
dressing problems within the profession, then U.S. Supreme Court Jus-
tice Sandra Day O'Connor in 1999 observed that attorneys are more than
three times as likely as non-lawyers to suffer from depression, to develop
drug dependence, to get divorced or to contemplate suicide. They suffer
from higher than average rates of stress-related diseases such as ulcers,
coronary artery disease and hypertension. 59 A RAND Institute study of
lawyers in California found them to be "'profoundly pessimistic about
the state of the legal profession and its future,' and that only half would
choose to become lawyers if they had it to do over.,
60
Many describe the conditions of contemporary legal practice as
brutal. Lawyers' income is tied to how much they work. Either volunta-
rily, or by compulsion, lawyers work long hours. And in a society of
instant electronic connections, business goes on around the clock.
A recent conversation I had with a young bar leader was illustrative.
His six-year-old son started making loud noises every time the lawyer
reached for his Blackberry or cell phone. When he asked his son to stop
and inquired as to why the boy was making so much noise, the boy rep-
lied that he did not want his Dad to work when he was at home. The
father confessed to me that he felt conflicted; he too wanted to spend
time with his son, but he had been bluntly instructed by his superior that
his working hours were not limited to the office. "If a client wants to
talk with you in the middle of the night, you better be available."
In a culture where the cost of legal education has increased marked-
ly along with the number of lawyers, there has been a change in the in-
ternal culture of law firms and in their relationships with clients. To
make adequate profits, fewer resources can be devoted to training new
associates. They, instead, become a profit center. As more lawyers
compete for a limited client base, they must perpetually hustle to bring
clients in and to make sure that clients are satisfied with the results ob-
57. See JOHN P. HEINZ Er AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR
271-74 (2005); NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER RES. & EDUC. & AM. BAR FOUND., AFTER THE JD:
FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 7 (2004), available at
http://www.nalpfoundation.org/webmodules/articles/articlefiles/87-After JD-2004-web.pdf.
58. See Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Why Lawyers are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 33
(2001); John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers and Their Discontents: Findings from a Survey of the Chicago
Bar, 74 IND. L.J. 735 (1999); Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy and Ethical Member of
an Unhappy, Unhealthy and Unethical Profession, 52 VAN. L. REV. 871, 871-906 (1999).
59. O'Connor, supra note 49, at 386; see also RHODE, supra note 50, at 8; Michael J. Swee-
ney, The Devastation of Depression, B. LEADER, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 11; William W. Eaton et al.,
Occupations and Prevalence of Major Depressive Disorder, 32 J. OCC. MED. 1079, 1081 (1990).
60. O'Connor, supra note 49, at 386. Several highly publicized books in the 1990's advanced
the theme that lawyers had lost their former ideals as statesmen, public leaders, as preservers of the
public good. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How CRISIS IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); SOL M. LINowrrz WITH
MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (1994); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1993).
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tained. Thus, the attorney's need for compensation becomes consonant
with satisfying the client's objectives.
In addition, many lawyers describe behavior within the profession
as brutish. All of us know lawyers who have left the profession, and
most of us have heard statements like the following: "I am tired of the
deceit. I am tired of chicanery. But most of all, I am tired of the misery
my job causes other people." Many attorneys believe that "zealously
representing their clients" means pushing all the rules of ethics and de-
cency to the limit. Some have reached the point that they simply "don't
want to mud wrestle anymore." In a speech to law students at the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma, Justice O'Connor noted that a National Law Jour-
nal study reported that over 50% of the attorneys surveyed used the word
"obnoxious" to describe their colleagues.6'
Such negativity is apparent even in law schools, where students
complain of a contentious, competitive and combative environment, and
that the single most common reason for becoming a lawyer is the eco-
nomic reward.
The whole adversarial system is set up to produce winners and losers,
just as the grading curve creates winners and losers-and the losers
don't get the jobs they want. It is a winner-take-all system, and for
some that means winning at any cost.
62
Sometimes I have the pleasure of taking a new law graduate out to
lunch to congratulate him or her on his or her accomplishment and to
offer encouragement in the ensuing job search. Recently, responding to
my question about what propelled her to go to law school, a new law
school graduate confided in a whisper that she had done so because she
wanted to help people. When I asked why she whispered, she replied
that she was embarrassed and did not want anyone to hear that her prima-
ry objective was not like that of her classmates-to make lots of money.
C. The combination of public distrust and professional dissatisfaction
creates a Cycle of Cynicism
The problem with public distrust and professional dissatisfaction is
that they create a self-perpetuating Cycle of Cynicism about legal institu-
tions and the Rule of Law. Such negative attitudes foster an expectation
61. Sandra Day O'Connor, Professionalism, Address at the Dedication of the University of
Oklahoma's Law School Building and Library (Apr. 30, 2002), in 55 OKLA. L. REv. 197, 199
(2002). Justice O'Connor identified common, combative language that lawyers customarily use to
describe their experiences:
"I attacked every weak point in their argument"
"Her criticisms were right on target"
"I demolished his position"
"If we use that strategy, she will wipe us out"
"I shot down each of their contentions."
62. EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note I, at 149.
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that the legal system will fail in its duty to serve society, and behavior
consonant with that expectation leads to the expected failure-first in
small ways, then in ever-larger ones.
Clients who do not trust the law and the legal system to protect
them search for aggressive lawyers to do so. Those clients may believe
that they know more about the law than do their attorneys, refuse advice
that is offered, or disparage the lawyers' advice if it points toward an
outcome that is not the client's desire. They may not pay their bills, and
they may threaten to or actually sue for malpractice if outcomes do not
meet their specifications.
Lawyers, in competition for business, fear rejecting any client, even
if the client has unreasonable expectations. In service to their clients
(and to be paid), attorneys believe that they must promise and deliver
according to the clients' expectations. Sometimes attorneys let clients
over-control; sometimes attorneys act in pre-emptive self-defense to pro-
tect against later attack if results do not satisfy the clients.63
Many attorneys at side bar or in chambers candidly admit that they
cannot control their clients or convince them to be reasonable. Some
admit that the only reason they are proceeding to trial is because their
clients want to tell their story or have their "day in court," regardless of
the merit of their claims or defenses, or that they have taken the cases on
contingent fee bases, are upside down in expenses and cannot be paid
unless they get favorable verdicts. Other lawyers feel they must impress
their clients with courtroom performances of exaggerated intensity, thea-
trics or contentious and unprofessional behavior.
Lawyers who are vulnerable to their clients may have difficulty
maintaining objectivity or resisting clients' demands. To reduce clients'
expectations, lawyers may project excessive unpredictability on the legal
process, lack of trustworthiness on the opposing counsel, personal ani-
mosity on the judge or lack of attention or understanding on the jury.
(Indeed, when I was a trial lawyer, I recall telling clients that going to
court was a lot like gambling in Las Vegas.) And if there is an unfavora-
ble outcome, it is only human nature to blame the adversary, the process,
the jury or the judge. Such actions feed distrust of lawyers and the legal
system and fuel the fear that it is the whims of individuals rather than the
Rule of Law that governs society.
In his recent book, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of
Law,64 Brian Z. Tamanaha 65 argues that both the public and the legal
63. This manifests in a variety of ways, such as so-called "CYA" letters, memos to the file,
and asking other attorneys or staff to sit in on conversations to document what occurs. Attorneys in
my district candidly admit that they file at least one motion to dismiss and one motion for summary
judgment in every case, regardless of whether such is warranted, simply because they fear the pros-
pect of a malpractice claim if they don't.
64. TAMANAHA, supra note 4.
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profession now believe that the law no longer has any societal benefit; it
is simply a tool that clients and interest groups use to accomplish selfish
purposes. This, he contends, undermines both the effect of and confi-
dence in the Rule of Law.66
Tamanaha's evidence is compelling. He provides a comprehensive
tracing of legal theory67 and application over the last century. He ex-
amines legal education, the role of academia, the practicing profession
and the judiciary. With regard to each, he documents trends and pro-
vides a multitude of examples that demonstrate disdain for the Rule of
Law and efforts to escape it.
Tamanaha's study also points out two ways in which lawyers have
so narrowed their perspective that they cannot see society's need for and
dependence upon the Rule of Law. The first is in the belief that an attor-
ney's only duty is to the client. When this occurs, lawyers are more like-
ly to bend, twist or manipulate the law and legal process to achieve the
client's objective. With such a narrow focus, the attorney can be blinded
to the impact that his or her conduct has on public confidence. Several
examples come to mind.
My court reporter tells of an attorney who complained to him after a
hearing by asking why the judge was so intent on following the rules.
The attorney was shocked by the reporter's response, "because they are
the rules." This exchange reflects an all too common view that judges
are free to, and should, ignore the rules (or the law).
Another illustration arises in the criminal context. A prosecutor and
defense attorney jointly asked for a sentence reduction for an offender
65. Cardozo Professor of Law at St. John's University School of Law. Professor Tamanaha is
also the author of ON THE RULE OF LAW (2004), A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY
(2001), and REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY (1997). He is a frequent contributor to and associate
editor of Law and Society Review.
66. Tamanaha's definition of the Rule of Law is slightly different than that used here. He
contends, based upon historical legal theory, that law necessarily should direct itself to the public
good. I agree with his critic, Ofer Raban, that in our pluralistic society we rarely agree on what the
"public good" is. See Raban, supra note 26, at 482-83. Dr. Raban is an Assistant Professor of Law
at the University of Oregon.
67. Building on his earlier book On the Rule of Law, Tamanaha observes that through the
close of the 19th Century the law had generally been regarded as having an immanent, or objective
quality:
"A few centuries ago ... law was widely understood to possess a necessary
content and integrity that was, in some sense, given or predetermined. Law
was the right ordering of society binding on all. Law was not entirely subject
to our individual or group whims or will. There were several versions of this.
Law was thought to consist of rules or principles immanent within the cus-
toms or culture of the society, or of God-given principles disclosed by revela-
tion or discoverable through he application of reason, or of principles dictated
by human nature, or of the logically necessary requirement of objective legal
concepts."
TAMANAHA, supra note 4, at 1; see also G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION:
PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES (3d ed. 2007) (tracing the development of the American
legal tradition through biographical commentary on jurists such as Marshall, Holmes, and Burger).
[Vol. 86:3
ETHOS FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION
who had been convicted of defrauding a number of victims. The law
accorded the victims the opportunity to speak at sentencing and required
the court to consider their comments in imposing sentence. Modification
of the sentence could be made only within a short, specified period fol-
lowing its issuance, and the period could not be extended. The period
had passed before the request for reduction, and no notice had been given
to the victims of the parties' request. At the hearing, the attorneys ac-
knowledged that the allowed time had expired and no further extension
could be granted, but nevertheless they argued for the reduction. Their
argument was that neither the deadline nor the absence of victim input
mattered because they had agreed on the sentence ... and by the way,
because they had agreed, no one would appeal the reduction. This argu-
ment is what I call a "winky-wink" argument. It essentially is that the
law does not matter if we agree that it does not.
Similar arguments are made in civil cases as well, but in ordinary
civil litigation parties have much more freedom to craft solutions to their
problems. This is limited in some arenas, however, where settlements
must meet statutory requirements. For example, in a bankruptcy case, a
debtor-in-possession and major creditors proposed a plan of reorganiza-
tion that suited them, but it did not conform to the statutory requirements
that required notice to and the consent of other creditors. They were
angry that the judge would not approve it.
Another example of the effect of this narrowing of focus occurs
when attorneys invite judges and juries to ignore the law. I call these
"invitations to activism." In civil jury trials, attorneys purposely attempt
to stir up emotional responses in jurors even though the jurors are in-
structed not to base their decision on "sympathy or prejudice." Or coun-
sel argue about the "equities" in the case and try to paint one party as the
"good guy" and another as the "bad guy," thereby asking for a moral
rather than a legal assessment. Sometimes attorneys ask judges and ju-
ries to "send messages" or to correct bad laws. They make speeches in
the courtroom and on the steps to the courthouse that they hope will
make the evening news. They argue the merits of the result their client
wants rather than about how the law should apply. This happens so often
that I now routinely remind parties to administrative appeals that I will
not be evaluating the wisdom of the underlying determination, only the
process by which it was obtained. In other opinions, to avoid misunders-
tanding, I often begin with a paragraph describing what issues the Court
is not deciding.
The effect of a narrow focus is not limited to practicing attorneys,
however. It can become the source of uncivil comments among jurists
and arrogance among legislators. Some years ago, I was introduced to a
U.S. Senator from another state. He was an attorney and a member of
the Senate Judiciary Committee. During the conversation we discussed
how legislators determined which statutes needed revision or correction.
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I explained that the Senators of my state had asked me to send copies of
opinions in which I found a statutory ambiguity, where the statute was
inconsistent with other law or where legislative intent was unclear. The
Senator with whom I was talking was obviously puzzled. As he stated,
"Why would anyone bother with what a judge says-lobbyists will tell
me whenever a law needs revision."
A second narrowing in focus that Tamanaha points out grows out of
the size and diversity within the legal profession. We have become bal-
kanized. During the 18th, 19th and early 20th Centuries, in the course of
their professional lives, leaders in the legal profession often performed
multiple roles, such as practicing attorney, legislator, administrator,
judge, and law professor.6 Such lawyers brought not only diverse expe-
riences to each new role; they maintained contact and conversation with
colleagues in disciplines left behind. This allowed members of the pro-
fession to communicate values and ideas outside of a particular job or
endeavor.
In comparison, modern membership in the legal profession is more
diverse and widespread, but we are also more divided. We distinguish
ourselves by function-academics, practicing lawyers, government law-
yers and the judiciary. Then within these functions, we have special-
ties-for academics it may be by school or area of interest, for practi-
tioners it may be by firm and practice specialty, and among judges it may
be by type of court where one serves.6 9 In addition, there are a multitude
of national, state, local and specialty bar associations and groups, 70 each
of which has its own purpose and objectives. 7' Although lawyers may
68. Indeed, one only has to reflect upon legal legends to recall their various roles-Jefferson,
Madison, Hamilton, Marshall, Kent, Storey, Shaw, Lincoln, Taney, Harlan, Holmes, Hand, Cardozo,
Frankfurter, Taft and Pound, to name just a few. These lawyers had the benefit of legal experience
gained from different vantage points and maintained contacts (and communication) with those active
in the differing facets of the profession.
69. Indeed, I recall one judge who would not associate with or refer to judges on other courts
as "colleagues."
70. National legal associations include the American Bar Association (www.abanet.org) and
the Federal Bar Association (www.fedbar.org). Prominent state groups include the Colorado Bar
Association (www.cobar.org) and the Colorado Criminal Defense Bar (www.ccdb.org). At the local
level, groups include the Arapahoe Country Bar Association
(www.cobar.org/index.cfmID/20089/ARAP/Arapahoe-County), the Denver Bar Association
(www.denbar.org), and the Boulder County Bar Association (www.boulder-bar.org). Finally, in-
fluential specialty groups include the American Constitution Society
(www.americanconstitutionsociety.org), the Federalist Society (www.fed-soc.org), the American
Association for Justice (www.justice.org), and The Faculty of Federal Advocates
(www.facultyfederaladvocates.org).
71. For example, Judge Richard A. Posner comments on the change of the relationship of law
schools and professors to the practicing bar in his tribute to Bernard D. Meltzer. Richard A. Posner,
In Memoriam, Bernard D. Meltzer (1914-2007), 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 435, 435 (2007). He contends
that due to the absorption of law schools into universities, they have adopted a more academic focus,
seeking to perpetuate their reputation in academic circles rather than to prepare graduates to practice
law. See id. at 436. The contemporary refrain is, "We teach you law, not how to be a lawyer". This
is one of the primary criticisms of law schools articulated by the Camegie Foundation in EDUCATING
LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 24.
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belong to a number of organizations or engage in more than one activity,
there are few who share a holistic view of the profession with all of its
component parts. The narrowing of our viewpoint as lawyers either to a
client's objectives or to a particular practical, political or personal view-
point has the potential of blinding us to a larger perspective. We focus
on what we do, not how it contributes or detracts from the public's over-
all confidence in legal institutions and legal processes. Our single
minded focus thus fuels the Cycle of Cynicism.
Since the fundamental tenet of the Rule of Law is that no man is
above it and that the law applies equally to all, no one, even the govern-
ment can ignore it, manipulate it or violate it without consequence. It
follows that if the law can be bought, sold, manipulated, violated or ig-
nored by anyone, then that person is above the law. The fear that people
regularly violate the Rule of Law is at the core of the Cycle of Cynicism.
This is why the public rails at incidents of public or private corruption,
despises judges who apply their personal viewpoints rather than the law,
fears that money buys judicial outcomes, and resents outcomes based
upon manipulation of the law it calls "legal technicalities." This is why
the public disapproves of policies (and presidents) that authorize actions,
such as torture, based on what is characterized as a highly technical legal
analysis, or locate detention centers outside the United States in order to
avoid application of United States law. This is also why people laugh at
jokes in which lawyers attempt to take advantage of the law for personal
benefit, but are ultimately held accountable under it.
72
If the public sees the law as simply a collection of meaningless ex-
pressions that can be violated with impunity, be manipulated or con-
trolled by a few, or be changed outside authorized processes, they may
well conclude that the law will not protect them from anyone or any-
thing. As a result, they may understandably reason that there is no need
to follow the law, and to the contrary, that they are entitled to violate it in
order to protect themselves and their interests. This is the mentality that
is common in groups estranged from society (e.g., gangs and criminal
populations) and in societies without legal structure. One response to
72. This joke, or versions of it, is an old stand-by. It apparently originated sometime during
the 1960's and even became a Brad Paisley song.
A lawyer purchased a box of very rare and expensive cigars, then insured them against
loss by fire. Within a month, he had smoked the entire stockpile of the great cigars, and
without having made even the first insurance premium payment, he submitted a claim for
their loss. The insurance company denied the claim, and the lawyer sued, alleging that
the cigars were lost in a series of small fires. The court found the claim frivolous, but
nevertheless enforced the insurance contract against its drafter, the insurance company.
To avoid costs on appeal, the insurance company paid $15,000 for the cigars.
After the lawyer cashed the check, the insurance company complained to the district at-
torney. The district attorney charged 24 counts of arson. With his insurance claim and
his own testimony from the civil case as admissions, the attorney was convicted of inten-
tionally burning the insured property and was sentenced to 24 months in jail and a
$24,000 fine.
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widespread lawbreaking is authoritarian control. Locke long ago identi-
fied the ultimate risk, "Without law, there is tyranny."
I do not mean to suggest that American society is about to fall off
the precipice into anarchy nor that we are about to surrender our liberties
to dictatorial control, but because American society is unique in its belief
in and dependence upon the Rule of Law, the stability of American so-
ciety is particularly vulnerable to loss of public confidence in the law and
legal institutions, If we do not find ways to reverse the Cycle of Cynic-
ism and restore confidence in legal institutions and the Rule of Law, the
cohesiveness of our society and the protection of our individual rights are
in jeopardy.
Although lawyers do not control the future, individually and collec-
tively they can wield significant power in influencing it. Reversal of the
Cycle of Cynicism may well depend on us. The antidote to cynicism is
belief. If lawyers do not believe in and demonstrate a commitment to the
Rule of Law and the legal institutions that implement it, there is little
reason for the public to do so.
This prompts fundamental questions about the ethos of the legal
profession: What do lawyers believe in? What are they committed to?
II. LEGAL ETHOS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
A. What is a professional ethos?
In thinking about ethos, it is first helpful to define it. Ethos is a be-
lief or collection of beliefs, or ideas or attitudes that guide a person,
group or institution.73 Ethos is not a childlike belief in something magi-
cal. Ethos, instead, is a dedication or commitment to a belief or value.
Ethos is not the same as ethics. Ethics are rules for conduct; they regu-
late behavior.74 Ethics implement ethos. Put differently, ethos is the
"why" we do what we do; ethics is the "what" or "how" we do it.
Ethos is relatively easy to define for a cohesive group that has
formed around a set of beliefs or values. The ethos of this type of group
often is articulated in a "statement of belief" or a mission statement.
75
73. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 429 (1 1th ed. 2003), available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com.
74. Ethics is defined as "the principles of conduct governing an individual or a group." Id.
75. Churches, schools and associations often have statements of belief. See, e.g., The Church
of the Nazarene: Agreed Statement of Belief (2008), http://www.nazarene.org/ministries/
administration/visitorcenter/beliefs/display.aspx; The College Board, Connecting Students to Col-
lege Success, http://www.collegeboard.comaboutindex.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2009); Ottawa-
Glandorf Rotary Club, Mission Statement of the Ottawa Glandorf Rotary Club,
http://www.ogrotary.org (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) ("Gather and unite a group of men and women
who have a core belief in the motto "SERVICE ABOVE SELF' who are willing to contribute their
time, talent and treasure to that belief under the banner of Rotary International to serve mankind with
projects that are International, National and Local in scope and to become the premier service club in
our county.").
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The legal profession has neither because we are associated primarily by
our education and by what we do. For example, we do not meet periodi-
cally as a whole or share a common uniform, song, handshake, motto or
creed. As a consequence, identifying common beliefs or values among
lawyers is difficult.
In discerning whether we have an ethos and what it might be, it is
helpful to look at other learned professions-medicine, the clergy, and
education. In each of these, there are arguably two types of commit-
ments or devotions. The first is to a particular beneficiary-patient, pe-
nitent, or student. The second is to a value or ideal that transcends and
benefits both the professional and the beneficiary. The transcendent val-
ue is like an umbrella-it covers, animates and gives meaning to all of
the professional's actions. In medicine, the commitment is to Health,
with the clergy it is to God, and in teaching it is to Knowledge.
By logical extension, one might expect the legal profession also to
have dual devotions-one to the client and one to a transcendent value.
The obligation to the client is generally accepted, and indeed, we seem to
perform that obligation admirably. But unfortunately, for the legal pro-
fession there is no clearly recognized and commonly accepted devotion
to a transcendent value or belief.
76
In searching for some articulation of a transcendent value, one
might look to the lawyers' oath or to ethical standards. But neither clear-
ly identifies nor requires dedication to a transcendent value. The word-
ing of the lawyer's oath varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In most
oaths, lawyers promise to do certain things, like uphold the Constitution
and to adhere to professional standards, but the oath does not state why
the lawyer should do this.77 In other words, the oath does not profess
76. This is what, arguably, gives rise to the criticism that the legal profession is just a busi-
ness. See discussion supra Part I.C.
77. See for example the Lawyers Oath in Colorado and in South Carolina. The oath for
attorneys in Colorado reads:
I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the
State of Colorado; I will maintain the respect due to Courts and judicial offic-
ers; I will employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor; I
will treat all persons whom I encounter through my practice of law with fair-
ness, courtesy, respect and honesty; I will use my knowledge of the law for
the betterment of society and the improvement of the legal system; I will nev-
er reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defense-
less or oppressed; I will at all times faithfully and diligently adhere to the Col-
orado Rules of Professional Conduct.
COLO. BAR ASS'N, COLO. ATr'Y OATH OF ADMISSION, http://www.cobar.org/index.cfml
ID/1653/CETHi/Colorado-Attomey-Oath-of-Admission/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). The
Oath for attorneys in South Carolina reads:
I am duly qualified, according to the Constitution of this State, to exercise the
duties of the office to which I have been appointed, and that I will, to the best
of my ability, discharge those duties and will preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of this State and of the United States; I will maintain the respect
and courtesy due to courts of justice, judicial officers, and those who assist
them; To my clients, I pledge faithfulness, competence, diligence, good judg-
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commitment to a transcendent value; it simply acts as a laundry list of
"should'a, ought'a and haft'as". The words state what we promise to do,
but they do not profess a commitment to any particular value. As a con-
sequence, they are empty. They fail to give our work meaning or to in-
spire us to reach beyond the specifics listed.
The same is true for Codes of Professional Responsibility or Ethical
Canons. They set out standards for behavior. Arguably, they articulate
the professional commitment to the client, but they do not contain any
statement or profession of a transcendent value. They do not set forth a
rationale for why we should act in a particular way.
Law students readily recognize this. In law school, ethics is most
often taught as a required doctrinal class. In studying the ethical rules,
students use the same analytical skills that they would use for courses
such as torts and contracts.7 8 Ethics is simply the law that governs la-
wyering.79
This view continues among lawyers in practice. We comply with
ethical rules as minimal standards and satisfy continuing legal education
requirements for periodic ethical instruction. But if we were asked what
we as lawyers believe in or are committed to, most of us would not know
what to say.
Identification of a professional ethos might be found in traditions or
admonitions of professional associations. But unfortunately, neither re-
flects a clear statement of any transcendent value nor a commonly held
commitment to it. Prior to the twentieth century, there was no written
ment and prompt communication; To opposing parties and their counsel, I
pledge fairness, integrity, and civility, not only in court, but also in all written
and oral communications; I will not pursue or maintain any suit or proceeding
which appears to me to be unjust nor maintain any defenses except those I be-
lieve to be honestly debatable under the law of the land, but this obligation
shall not prevent me from defending a person charged with a crime; I will em-
ploy for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me only such
means as are consistent with trust and honor and the principles of professio-
nalism, and will never seek to mislead an opposing party, the judge or jury by
a false statement of fact or law; I will respect and preserve inviolate the confi-
dences of my clients, and will accept no compensation in connection with a
client's business except from the client or with the client's knowledge and ap-
proval; I will maintain the dignity of the legal system and advance no fact pre-
judicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which I am charged; I will assist the defenseless or
oppressed by ensuring that justice is available to all citizens and will not delay
any person's cause for profit or malice.
RULE 402(K), SCACR.
78. As Karl Llewellyn, a noted legal educator, long ago observed, students are taught to
"knock your ethics into temporary anesthesia .... You are to acquire the ability to think precisely, to
analyze coldly . . . to see, and see only, and manipulate the machinery of the law." KARL
LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 116 (1985).
79. EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 24, 28 (contending that this form of instruction
misses an important dimension that is necessary for professional development-the social and moral
context for the lawyer's work).
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code of conduct for lawyers. Lawyers learned the law and their role in
society largely from mentors as they "read the law" or worked as appren-
tices. Despite public criticism, generally, the lawyer was expected to act
much like a statesman, relying upon his own judgments as to morality,
justice and public good.80 Like the concept of noblesse oblige,8' howev-
er, his obligation may have been as much the product of his socioeco-
nomic status as of any professional objective.
When law schools were created, a more formal statement of law-
yers' obligations was required. The first professional code, the 1908
Professional Canons, contained some aspirational language. It stated that
the lawyer "advances the honor of the profession and the best interests of
his client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress
upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest
principles of moral law."
As of 1969, attorneys were encouraged to "point out those factors
which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally per-
missible. 82 But in the early 1980s, this standard was significantly re-
laxed following a period of debate about the relative importance of the
attorney's obligation to clients versus his/her obligation as an officer of
the court. In 1982, the ABA rejected the Kutak Commission's proposal
that an attorney's duty of confidentiality abate in order to 1) rectify a
client's criminal or fraudulent act or 2) comply with the law. Though not
necessarily significant in substance, the rejection of these suggestions
signaled a philosophical shift more firmly toward the interests of the
client and away from any devotion to any larger interest.
83
Now the Model Rules state that, "A lawyer, as a member of the le-
gal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system
and public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of jus-
tice. "84 This statement hints at a transcendent value, but it does not ex-
pressly identify it. It appears to build off of the 1986 ABA Commission
on Lawyer Professionalism's statement that the profession has a "devo-
80. See Robert Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, in LAWYERS' ETHICS AND THE
PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 66 (Susan Carle ed., 2005); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Re-
publican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, in LAWYERS' ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE 53 (Susan Carle ed., 2005); Norman W. Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism:
Interrogating the Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, in LAWYERS' ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF
SOCIAL JUSTICE 61-62 (Susan Carle ed., 2005); see also ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, CANON
32 (1908), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/CanonsEthics.pdf.
81. See David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in Practice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV.
717, 723-24 (1988).
82. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1969) (amended 1980).
83. Since 1983, lawyers have been authorized to refer to moral, economic, social and political
factors that are relevant to client's situation, but are under no obligation to do so. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 2.1 (1983).
84. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble (1983).
2009]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tion to serving both the client's interest and the public good" 85 and the
1996 report of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to
the Bar that suggested that lawyers share "a common calling to promote
justice and public good. 86 The problem with the terms "public good"
and "promoting justice" is that neither have a precise meaning. Both
terms are amorphous, abstract and subject to a variety of subjective defi-
nitions. As Tamanaha points out, serving the "public good" and "pro-
moting justice" too often is a rationalization for otherwise satisfying the
client's objectives.
Over the years, bar leaders have repeatedly called for greater pro-
fessionalism, 87 but the word "professionalism" is equally vague and un-
defined. Specific admonishments that attorneys be more "civil" in their
dealings with each other, engage in public service such as pro bono re-
presentation, and to remember that they are "officers of the court" and
"handmaidens of the law" also fail to identify a professional ethos. They
do not articulate any belief or value to which we, as lawyers, are commit-
ted; they don't inspire us because they don't tell us why we should be-
have or not behave in a particular manner. They are, at best, prescrip-
tions for good conduct-to be civil, honest and reliable, and do good
deeds without compensation. But they do not unite us in a common be-
lief or commitment to something greater than ourselves. Therefore, we
continue in diverse directions without a common purpose. For example,
transactional lawyers reject the admonition that they act as "officers of
the court" because they do not go to court, and government lawyers con-
tend that, as public employees by definition, whatever they do is for pub-
lic good.
There is no doubt that there are many lawyers who have personal
guiding beliefs, who aspire to higher standards than those required for
licensing and who may even view the law as a calling. But such values
are not shared across the profession. Indeed, to the contrary, as a profes-
sion we seem to have only one consistently understood loyalty-to the
client. This means that we are obligated to do what our clients desire,
restricted only in that we cannot violate the law or our rules of ethics.
And by logical extension, lawyers who have no clients-law professors
and judges-arguably share no commitment with the remainder of the
85. COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, AM. BAR ASS'N, "....IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:"
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/professionatismVStanley-CommissionReport.pdf.
86. PROFESSIONALISM COMM., Teaching and Learning Professionalism, 1996 A.B.A. SEC.
LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR 6.
87. See, e.g., ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, CANON 15 (1908), available at
http:/www.abanet'orglcpr/nupc/Canons-Ethics.pdf ("nothing... fosters popular prejudice against
lawyers as a class ... [as much as the view that it is] the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may
enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause."); see also Peter W. Meldrim, Address of the
President, 38th Conf. Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 313, 323 (1915) ("Law is a profession, not a trade, and
success in it consists in more than money getting."); COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 85,
at 3.
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profession. This helps explain the vastly different views of the role and
value of law among the different sects of the profession.
It also helps explain lawyer dissatisfaction. Absent a philosophy
that gives broad meaning and importance to the law, it is difficult for
attorneys to have a sense of professional identity, any aspirational stan-
dard to guide judgment and behavior, or to find meaning in work that
does not fully achieve a client's objectives. There is no common belief
to facilitate cooperation or collaboration, and there is no counterweight
to clients' subjective demands--other than pleasing a client or receiving
a fee, there seems to be no value in what we do.
Recognizing that we lack a transcendent professional ethos helps
explain both professional dissatisfaction and its role in the Cycle of Cy-
nicism. A singular devotion to the interest of clients both deprives law-
yers of professional purpose and eats away at public confidence in legal
institutions and the Rule of Law. Lincoln recognized more than 175
years ago that "reverence for the laws" is indispensable to preservation
of our civic liberties.88 If lawyers-who are the most familiar with the
law-do not revere it, why should the rest of society?
B. The need for a transcendent ethos- dedication to the Rule of Law
What can act as an antidote to the Cycle of Cynicism? Like Tama-
naha, I do not believe that we can return to values of yesteryear as a re-
medy. We no longer operate under notions of "natural law," for we have
participated in making our own law for almost 250 years. We are a plu-
ralistic society with wide diversity in individual beliefs and values, and
in fostering social equality we have become more relativistic in our
judgments of differing views. Given such pluralism, it is not workable to
suggest that lawyers counsel clients as to the morality of their objectives.
Admonitions to lawyers to be more civil, honest and to perform public
service have not meaningfully affected the Cycle of Cynicism, and there
is no indication that more rules of professional conduct will do so. The
problems of the twenty-first century are new ones, or new versions of old
ones. They demand a contemporary allegiance that is infused with the
energy of our nation's core beliefs.
It is not workable to suggest that lawyers pledge allegiance to "the
Law" or "to legal institutions" even though we hope that the public will
have confidence in them. Reference to "the Law" in the abstract has no
meaning. And with regard to specific laws, few would agree with every
one. Indeed, many would debate not only the content of a particular law,
but also whether any law is necessary in the first place.
88. See Harrison Sheppard, American Principles & the Evolving Ethos of American Legal
Practice, 28 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 237, 238 (1996) (citing Abraham Lincoln, The Perpetuation of Our
Political Institutions: Address before the Young Men's Lyceum at Springfield, Illinois January 27,
1838, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRIrINGS 76, 80-81 (Roy P. Basler ed. 1946)).
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What is needed, I suggest, is something more profound: a profes-
sion of our dedication to a transcendent value that grounds us all as law-
yers, and that both benefits society and counterbalances the subjectivity
of any client's wishes. Our ethos should reflect our core national values
and the intrinsic paradox on which our country was founded-namely,
that people enjoy maximum freedom only when they create the law and
are equally constrained by it. Our profession should articulate the value
of, and commit our efforts to, supporting and preserving the Rule of
Law.
C. Critical Conversations
One might ask what dedication to the Rule of Law would look like.
How would it play out? What effect would it have? These are all good
questions for which there are no certain answers. To address these ques-
tions, we need to have a series of thoughtful and critical conversations
that involve all members and segments of the legal profession. If we are
willing to engage in professional introspection through such conversa-
tions, we may be able to reverse the Cycle of Cynicism.
1. Profession-wide Conversations
The first and most important conversations should involve all seg-
ments of the profession-law professors, practicing attorneys, judges,
law students and legislators-because each brings a unique perspective
to the questions of what the Rule of Law is and how a commitment to it
changes our behavior.
Some lawyers may have had little exposure to the history of juri-
sprudence or legal tradition in law school, and most probably have had
little time or energy to devote to it since graduation It is now time to
study, reflect, and discuss. Bar associations, Inns of Court, law schools,
judicial conferences, attorney continuing legal education classes, firm
retreats and discussion groups can focus our attention, provide resources,
inspire us to reflect privately and provide opportunities for conversation.
We can invite speakers, spark debate, and challenge old ways of thinking
and acting.
There is abundant information available on the subject. As is ap-
parent from the references in this article, legal academics have thought
and written extensively about the legal, political, historical and sociolog-
ical implications of the Rule of Law. They are best equipped to offer
perspectives as to where our notions of law come from, different under-
standings of the nature of law, and the effects of the limitation or exten-
sion of law on society.
Practitioners add the perspective of lawyers and clients in the "real
world." How does a lawyer translate abstract notions of the Rule of Law
into concrete application? How does a belief in the Rule of Law inter-
sect with the duty to the client? What obligation should an attorney have
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to counsel a client as to the law's limitations? How does a lawyer ex-
plain to a client that it is in the client's best interest to adhere to the law?
Judges bring a third perspective to the conversation. As many ob-
serve, they are the personification of the law and are therefore critical in
supporting the Rule of Law. They bring knowledge of the interplay be-
tween law and conflicting objectives in the courtroom, and what beha-
viors undermine or support confidence in the legal process. They can
address the benefits that come from focusing upon the applicable law in a
litigation context-easier narrowing of disputes, speedier and less costly
resolution of conflicts and greater predictability in outcome.
Law students offer observations both as to how they can best learn
about legal tradition and what relevance it has to the world as they see it.
Involving them in the conversation helps them form a professional iden-
tity and equips them to apply lessons from legal history to challenges of
the future. They will be the standard-bearers of the profession in the
future. It is critical that they understand the vital role that they will play
in American society.
Finally, legislators bring knowledge to both the process of making
law and the forces that motivate change in the law. Their commitment to
creating laws in a transparent fashion and to writing laws that can be
applied uniformly and are perceived to benefit society as a whole go a
long way toward inspiring confidence in the Rule of Law.
Each sector can learn from the others. If all share a commitment to
the Rule of Law, then there can be common ground upon which further
communication and trust can build. Judges might more carefully articu-
late the law and how it applies and might be more trusting of lawyers'
motivations. Lawyers might advise clients differently or vary their ap-
proaches in litigation and outside it. Academics, legislators and practic-
ing attorneys might see judicial decisions in a less contentious and less
political light. From these conversations, others may grow.
2. Conversations within law schools
Educating Lawyers contends that law students form their views of
the legal profession and their professional identity during law school. It
advocates teaching doctrine and professional values in an integrated fa-
shion.
Imagine a conversation among law faculty who have varying inter-
ests and expertise, but who are all committed to creating a curriculum
that remedies the insufficiency of civics education at primary, secondary
and undergraduate levels and produces a graduate who is conversant with
the history of legal thought and tradition as well as substantive law. Im-
agine a coordinated curriculum that weaves professional values into
every substantive course and demonstrates that codified ethical standards
are the natural outgrowth of professional values.
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Imagine graduates who believe that, in addition to earning an income,
being a lawyer adds value to society. Imagine that their idealism lasts
longer than their first job. Imagine that they find satisfaction in their
work, and that they can educate their clients, neighbors, friends and
children. They have the best chance of unwinding the Cycle of Cynic-
ism.
3. Conversations among jurists
One of the greatest fears about the judiciary is that it will exercise
unbridled power. Imagine a conversation among judges who are com-
mitted to the belief that no person, even a judge, is above the law. They
might talk about how to better explain the law, demonstrate its applica-
tion, or make processes more transparent, accessible and efficient. They
might try to simplify procedures and make the application of rules and
law more consistent. They might work harder to screen out their own
biases and be more "fair and impartial." They might be more hesitant to
play Solomon and "do justice" or tailor a legal outcome to match a per-
sonal predisposition. Instead, they might more rigorously follow the law,
and should it yield an outcome that they believe is unjust, they might be
both humble and courageous in saying so, but leave changes of the law to
the people who created it in the first place.
4. Conversations among lawyers and judges in litigation
All too often lawyers and judges see each other only as opponents.
Lawyers consider judges and the law to be impediments to desired out-
comes and opposing counsel as enemies. Judges see lawyers as comba-
tants who simply want to win at any cost or who act only to maximize
their revenues.
Imagine a conversation among counsel early in the case during
which they discuss what law applies to the controversy at hand. Imagine
them agreeing as to what law applies, and if so, whether the dispute is
one of interpretation of law or of a factual nature. If the lawyers do not
agree on the applicable law or upon its interpretation, imagine that they
then ask the judge to resolve this dispute, each offering his/her interpreta-
tion and research. Imagine that the judge also engages in legal research
and provides it to counsel for comment. As to the framing of legal is-
sues, litigation would then more closely resemble an intellectual explora-
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tion,89 with both counsel and the judge seeking to apply the correct law,
rather than the lawyers focusing solely on a desired outcome.
9
0
5. Conversations with clients9'
As noted earlier, lawyers are often faced with clients whose objec-
tives are not consistent with the law or whose expectations of how the
law will apply are unrealistic. That is due, in part, to human nature. On
an abstract level, as part of society at large, most of us endorse the law
because it provides order and stability. But we do not want to follow it if
it is inconsistent with our present personal interest. Thus, lawyers who
have a dual devotion to the client and the Rule of Law would be pre-
sented with a conflict, but also an opportunity. Imagine lawyers who are
able to explain this conflict as well as the way the clients' interests and
society's interest converge.
An example of this type of conversation is as follows. A client
wants to obtain investors for a business endeavor through a public or
private offering. The law requires that in doing so, he must disclose a
prior criminal conviction. The client does not want to do so for the prac-
tical reason that he fears that this might chill investor interest, and he
rationalizes this by correctly noting that the conviction was long ago, was
the result of bad legal advice and has nothing to do with either this busi-
ness or his honesty and reliability. (This is a version of "the law
shouldn't apply to me.")
The lawyer who has no devotion to the Rule of Law might simply
advise the client as to the applicable law and consequences of not com-
plying and leave it to the client to decide whether to disclose or not. But
the lawyer who also seeks to serve the Rule of Law might take a different
89. In my experience, this happens more frequently in controversies in specialty areas of the
law, for example criminal, tax, patent or bankruptcy litigation. The civility in these specialty areas
has often been attributed to the small size of the Bar and the fact that practitioners deal with each
other repeatedly. That may be so, in addition, I think it is due to uniform familiarity with the law of
the specialty and the common ground that it creates.
90. This would be something wholly different from the process described by Roscoe Pound in
1906: "The effect of our exaggerated, contentious procedure is not only to irritate parties, witnesses
and jurors in particular cases, but to give to the whole community a false notion of the purpose and
end of the law. Hence comes in large sense the modem America race to beat the law. If the law is a
mere game, neither the players who take part in it nor the public who witnesses it can be expected to
yield to its spirit when their interests are served by evading it ... Thus, the courts, instituted to
administer justice according to the law, are made agents and abettors of lawlessness." Roscoe
Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29th Conf. Pt. I
Annu. Rep. A.B.A. 395, 406 (1906), reprinted in LANDMARKS OF LAW 180, 187 (Roy D. Henson
ed., 1960).
91. These conversations also can become conversations within law firms. When new or
inexperienced attorneys have questions or seek advice from more experienced lawyers, the conversa-
tions often impart values as well as information. Imagine the difference between a conversation that
conveys the message that the new lawyer should do everything possible to satisfy the client and one
in which the new lawyer is encouraged to research the law and explain it as accurately as possible to
the client. The latter case includes an opportunity for the less experienced lawyer to develop a
dedication to the Rule of Law as well as to serve the client, as the more skilled and experienced
lawyer has already learned to do.
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approach by explaining to the client that if no disclosure is made, and the
deal works out as anticipated, then the non-disclosure will never be a
problem. But that if the business is not successful and the investors be-
come unhappy they may sue and learn of the non-disclosure. In that
event, the law will not protect the client because the client did not adhere
to the law. Thus the law, as inconvenient as it is, ultimately protects the
client.
The difference here is not necessarily in the outcome-the client
may still decide not to disclose-but in the explanation. No moral lesson
is offered in the latter case, simply a statement and demonstration of the
effect and purpose of the Rule of Law.
Another example arises in a litigation context. The lawyer seeks to
prepare the client for the courtroom process and the potential of an ad-
verse outcome. If the lawyer is not concerned with the Rule of Law or
the need for public confidence in legal process, she might talk only about
the people who will be making the decision. "Judge Smith likes little old
ladies and doesn't like smart alecks," or "The jury favors whoever it
thinks is the underdog." Or to get the best jury, "let's employ a jury con-
sultant who will be able to tell us which jurors are likely to like you."
While there might be merit to these observations, the implicit message is
that outcome will turn on personal predilections of the fact-finder, rather
than application of the law.
Imagine a different conversation with the same purpose-to help
the client have reasonable expectations. Instead of the focusing on the
personal predilections or preferences of the judge or jury, the lawyer
emphasizes the law and how it must be applied. For example, "The law
requires the judge/jury to carefully consider a number of factors or cir-
cumstances, including how old the parties are and how much experience
or knowledge they have. This is because the judge/jury has to craft an
outcome that is particular to the facts of the case. Although we can ex-
pect that the judge/jury will follow the law, we can't guess exactly how
the judge/jury might evaluate each factor, so I can't guarantee an out-
come." The difference here is that the client is told that the legal process
will be followed even though the outcome is uncertain. In addition, both
winner and loser can walk away from the process believing that it was
the law that was applied to the facts at hand; it was not a personal judg-
ment as to the party's worth. This reaffirms the predictability and stead-
fastness of the law, rather than the capriciousness and unfairness of the
legal system.
IV. CONCLUSION
Law is the mortar that holds American society together and the pa-
radox of the Rule of Law is at the heart of our nation's promise of liberty
and opportunity. Due to the intrinsic role law plays in American society,
the beliefs of lawyers about the law and legal institutions matter. To
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reverse the Cycle of Cynicism and to preserve the Rule of Law in the
twenty-first century, members of the legal profession must engage in a
careful reflection upon our role in society. At the core of this introspec-
tion we must decide-are we, individually and as a profession, commit-
ted to the Rule of Law? If so, how do we profess and demonstrate that
commitment? I invite you to ponder these questions and to continue this
conversation-the future of our profession and American society may
well depend on it.

